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I. INTRODUCTION
In his exhaustive study, Oriental Despotism, Karl Wittfogel con-
cludes that the need for "large-scale and government-managed works
of irrigation and flood control" was the reason for the totalitarian
structure of many ancient and medieval eastern societies.' Put other-
wise, centralized state control was needed in order to organize, run, and
protect large-scale government public works projects. This notion of
"Asiatic despotism" was viewed by Marx as an exception to his laws of
economic development. 2 Under "Asiatic despotism" it is the technologi-
cal imperative, rather than the economic "mode of production," that
* Visiting Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America. The
speech on which this essay is based was given when I was a Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foun-
dation, Washington, D.C., which provided an extraordinary intellectual environment within which
to think on matters of government regulation.
1. KARL WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DSPOsTIsM 3 (1995).
2. Karl Marx, The British Rule in India, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., July 25, 1853, in 12 KARL
MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS: COLLECTED WORKS 125 (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1979).
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determines the structure of society and need for a strong, overbearing
state.3
The notion that technology necessitates bureaucracy and that bu-
reaucracy would inevitably lead to an overreaching state was a popular
one in the "short" twentieth century-the years from the outbreak of
the First World War to the collapse of the USSR.4 Modern (meaning
before the fall of the Berlin wall) Marxist scholars recognized the dan-
gers inherent in what some termed the bureaucratisation du monde.5
Liberals prophesied that a knowledge-based elite, be they scientists or
engineers, were taking over. 6 Conservatives bewailed the advent of
"The Technological Society" with its concomitant loss of faith.7 Many
have accepted the inevitability of continued bureaucratic centralization,
as evidenced by the title of a recent law review article: The Rise and
Rise of the Administrative State.8
In this short paper I hope to point out two aspects of twenty-first
century political life that relate to the challenge of ensuring govern-
ment accountability. The first point relates to how advances in com-
puter and media technology increase the potential of government ac-
countability and how these technological developments will increase
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, or, in the American
context, devolution of political power to state and local governments.
Second, I will address the impact of these developments on administra-
tive law in the next century.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
Recently both futurists and students of democracy have begun to
3. Id.; see also MARIAN SAWER, MARXISM AND THE QUESTION OF THE ASIATIC MODE OF
PRODUCTION 41-46 (1977) (highlighting Marx's belief that Asian society's lack of private prop-
erty ownership stems from the reliance on the government for "providing public works," including
irrigation).
4. I borrow the term from ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: THE SHORT TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY 1914-1991 (1994).
5. See BRUNO Rizzo, LA BUREAUCRATISATION DU MONDE (1939). Part I of this book was
translated as THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD (Adam Westoby trans., The Free Press
1985).
6. See, e.g., JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 282-95 (1967) (discussing
the educational and scientific establishment); Daniel Bell, Notes on the Post-Industrial Society
(I), PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1967, at 24, 27-28; Zbigniew Brzezinski, America in the Technetronic
Age, ENCOUNTER, Jan. 1968, at 16.
7. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson trans., 1964)
(1954).




think about technological determinism in radically different terms. No
longer does technological advance assume a more bureaucratic central-
ized society. Thus in The Electronic Republic, Larry Grossman has
argued that:
This is the first generation of citizens who can see, hear, and judge their own
political leaders simultaneously and instantaneously. It is also the first generation
of political leaders who can address the entire population and receive instant
feedback about what the people think and want. Interactive telecommunications
increasingly give ordinary citizens immediate access to the major political deci-
sions that affect their lives and property.9
This means that technology can be used to make governments more
accountable. The very same technology that is feared by technolud-
dites ° and is the cause, so Marxists say, of "Asiatic despotism" also
contains the potential for the kind of devolved (and involved) demos
that conservatives support as well. Now, scholars like Michael Fitts
suggest that too much knowledge can be bad for democracy." I incline,
however, to the opposing view that increased information availability
may in fact "reconnect" American voters to the political process and
help solve this country's problems with low voter turnout. 12 Regardless
of one's views regarding the appropriate level of information availabil-
ity, the emerging electronic republic, however, "brings enormous politi-
cal leverage to ordinary citizens." 13 In this regard, technology empow-
ers citizens by providing them with a playing field in which they can
compete with professional lobbyists and politicians.
9. LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC 4 (1995).
10. See, e.g., KIRKPATRICK SALE, REBELS AGAINST THE FUTURE: LESSONS FOR THE COM-
PUTER AGE (arguing that "a world by the technologies of the industrial society is more detrimen-
tal than beneficial to human happiness and survival"); see also Michael Pellechia, A Fascinating
Look at Folks Rebelling Against the Future, STAR TIB. (Minneapolis), June 9, 1995, at 2 (com-
paring Sale with the Luddites of the Industrial Revolution).
11. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917, 920 (1990) (contrasting Fitts's argu-
ment with the traditional economic ideal of perfect information). This approach reminds one of
the political scientists of the 1950s who argued that low voting rates reflect a healthy democracy
in that people are not so unhappy that they feel compelled to vote. See Tom DELUCA, THE Two
FACES OF POLITICAL APATHY 78 (1995).
12. See RUy A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 154-58 (1992). This study
of voting behavior suggests that a core cause of low turnout rates in American elections is that
voters are not motivated. See id. at 57. One solution the author proposes is to make the voter feel
more a part of the political process. See id. at 148-51. This could be done through the greater
availability of information. See id. at 158-62.
13. GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 147.
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A. Accountability Through Openness in Government
One distinctly American approach to ensuring government ac-
countability has been a bias towards openness in government. This is
best expressed through the Freedom of Information Act principle that,
absent specific statutory exemptions, one should presume a general
right of access to government documents. 14 This bias towards openness
recognizes Max Weber's insight that secrecy is a way that bureaucratic
elites maintain both legitimacy and power.' 5 Open government is the
way for citizens to control this "sociology of domination."'"
There can be no doubt that the task of maintaining openness in
government becomes far easier in the computer age. For one, twenty-
first century technology makes government disclosure easier and more
efficient. Given that computer tapes are clearly "documents" under the
Freedom of Information Act,' the possibility of widening the ambit of
government disclosure inexpensively becomes a real possibility.
Further, given the present state of computer technology, as elec-
tronic filing predominates, such document requests become simple
tasks. Not only does ease of access improve-so does the quality of the
information accessed. Today, if asked for file references on Jones, a
government agency is likely to produce the file on Jones (and specific
cross-references) rather than all the instances in which references to
Jones appear in a database regardless of file title. This is understanda-
ble, as the manpower required to cross-check files in any systematic
way would be inordinate. But with existing information retrieval tech-
nologies, such reference checks become simple tasks, as the subjects of
Nexis database searches often learn to their discomfort. It is now possi-
ble to use hypertext to link files and documents that would otherwise
take much more time to search and retrieve.
At the same time, technology makes it simpler for citizens around
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (mandating that federal agencies make certain information availa-
ble to the public unless protected by a specific exemption); Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that FOIA creates a liberal disclosure requirement, and that exemp-
tions are to be construed narrowly). Sweden apparently has this general right of access as well.
See Peter Seipel, The Technology of Insight: Computers and Informed Citizens, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 417, 418-19 (1993).
15. DIRK KASLER, MAX WEBER: AN INTRODUCTION To His LIFE AND WORK 161-68
(1988) (discussing Weber's theory of the "sociology of domination").
16. Id.
17. Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that "FOIA applies to com-




the country to be aware of agency regulations and to participate in
agency rulemakings. Henry Perritt argues that information technology
can be a tremendous help to the administrative state.18 Devices such as
electronic bulletin boards and e-mail could facilitate the peaceful reso-
lution of disputes in either the adjudicative or rule-making context.1 9
The standard argument, of course, is that participation in agency
rulemaking (as an example) is limited to those interest groups who can
afford to participate in "inside the Beltway" games with lobbyists and
lawyers. Ordinary citizens, it has been argued, cannot compete and in
many instances do not even know about regulatory issues until they
have been resolved one way or another. The classic liberal response, of
course, is that public interest lawyers are the citizens' paladins; they
read the Federal Register daily and act as citizen-surrogates. One of
the reasons behind passage of the citizen-intervenor sections of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 0 in the 1970s was the perceived need
for local public interest lawyers to be paid to come to Washington to
represent local interests in FTC rulemakings.21
Technology, however, may well make that approach obsolete.
Modems and CD-ROMs make the Federal Register available in Boise,
Idaho and Butte, Montana. Lexis and Westlaw make agency regula-
tions and precedents available as well. Indeed, some agencies like the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission have begun to use electronic filing as
a primary tool in certain regulatory proceedings.
22
The SEC, for instance, uses a system which requires corporations
to file several required documents electronically. 23 Taxpayers are also
able to file returns electronically with the IRS.24 These are just exam-
ples of what is possible for filing periodic reports required by any num-
ber of agencies. This electronic filing not only benefits the reporting
18. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., President Clinton's Information Infrastructure Initiative: Com-
munity Regained?, 69 Cm.-KNTr L. Rav. 991, 1011-13 (1994).
19. See id. at 1012.
20. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1988)). Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
21. See S. CONF. REP. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7755, 7768 (considering the payment of counsel to represent interests which would
otherwise not be heard).
22. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 17,902, 17,916 (1995) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 52) (al-
lowing required filings to be made in electronic form, rather than by express mail).
23. See 17 C.F.R. § 232.10-232.103 (setting forth the application and requirements of the
SEC's electronic filing program, EDGAR).
24. See, e.g., Anne Willette, IRS Says PC Filers Get Quicker Returns, USA TODAY, Feb.
8, 1996, at IA.
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entity, but also the citizen seeking access to the information. Rather
than filing and waiting for a FOIA request, one can simply log onto a
computer and download publicly available information from home.
Computer technology has also assisted government accountability
by significantly empowering the "fifth estate" in promoting openness in
government. With the growth of databases like Nexis and Westlaw,
politicians can no longer change their views to suit their audience with-
out their inconsistencies being revealed-the database tells all. Simi-
larly, rookie reporters can gain immediate expertise through electronic
data searches, turning otherwise puff interviews into killer interroga-
tions. Technology, then, gives citizens the information they need to
compete with professional lobbyists; it gives people on the geographical
and political periphery the information resources required to compete
with those in the center.
B. Accountability Through Direct Democracy
According to traditional voting theory, voter participation is said
to serve several important functions in the operation of a democratic
system. 5 First, high rates of participation legitimize the government's
power to rule.26 Second, participation is a way to empower the average
citizen.17 Third, informed participation in the political process has been
viewed as a way to stimulate the intellectual development of the citi-
zenry.28 These benefits, however, are only present with high rates of
participation. This paper argues that technology, besides promoting ac-
cess to the data needed to make democracy work, will also increase
government accountability by promoting mechanisms for direct democ-
racy. With advances in technology, interaction with the government be-
comes easier and, consequently, more citizens take part.29 Futurists
25. See generally Stephen Earl Bennett & David Resnick, The Implications of Nonvoting
for Democracy in the United States, 34 AM. J. POL. ScI. 771 (1990); M. MARGARET CONWAY,
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES 189-90 (2d ed. 1990) (concluding that partici-
pation is a positive influence on the citizen's perception of government). This importance placed on
high participation counters the 1950s view that low participation reflected an unconcerned citizen
population. See WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, THE CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 153
(1982).
26. Bennett & Resnick, supra note 25, at 773-74.
27. Id. at 774-75.
28. Id. at 775-76.
29. See JEFFREY B. ABRAMSON ET AL., THE ELECTRONIC COMMONWEALTH (1988) (examin-
ing methods by which it becomes easier for citizens to affect their leaders, and easier for leaders to
interact with their constituency); EDWIN DIAMOND & ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, WHITE HOUSE TO
YOUR HOUSE: MEDIA AND POLITICS IN VIRTUAL AMERICA 3, 91-93 (1995) (exploring the numer-
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have discussed this possibility for years.30 Some have spoken of voting
on candidates and issues from your TV set.31 Others, like Ross Perot,
have spoken of electronic town meetings.
Recently, we have had live examples of this hope that technology
can be applied to effectuate democratic principles:
-Alaska has created a Legislative Teleconferencing Network and a
Legislative Information Network.2 The Teleconferencing Network en-
ables citizens in remote areas to appear before the Alaskan assembly.33
The network also allows elected representatives to hold tele-discussions
with their constituents,34 and the Information Network allows citizens
to send messages to their legislators.3 5
-Building on a program developed in the 1980s in Hawaii,36 Jim
Fishkin has established a National Issues Convention,3 7 where a ran-
dom group of citizens will vote on issues, break into discussion groups,
and reconvene to vote again. He argues that this process of informing
voters enhances the operation of democracy, as the public too often
votes without a full understanding of the issues at stake. 8 Fishkin in-
tends to use this program in the run-up to the 1996 election. 9
-The city of Santa Monica has a public access computer network that
allows its residents to exchange electronic mail with the city (managers
are required to respond within 24 hours) and conduct transactions such
as acquiring building permits and licenses.40
-Numerous World Wide Web home pages now allow citizens to access
ous experiments bringing television to the voters).
30. See ABRAMSON ET AL, supra note 29, at 164-165.
31. Id.
32. GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 156.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 156-57.
36. Hawaii's Televote program was an experiment whereby voters were asked to read mate-
rial on an issue and phone in their thoughts or votes. Id.
37. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY
(1995) (providing the text for a nationally televised discussion of issues).
38. Id. at 33-34. For a critical examination of Fishkin's theories about the proper operation
of democracy, see Phillip E. Converse, Fishkin's National Issues Convention Has Real Scientific
Merit, PUB. PERsP., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, at 11; Everett K. Ladd, Fishkin's "Deliberate Poll" Is
Flawed Science and Dubious Democracy, PUB. PERSP., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, at 41; Warren J.
Mitofsky, It's Not Deliberative and It's Not a Poll, PUB. PERSP., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, at 4;
Frank Newport, Why Do We Need a Deliberative Poll?, PUB. PERSP., Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, at 7.
39. Nancy Kruh, Citizen Fishkin-Austin Professor Plans a Convention to Educate the
American Electorate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 21, 1995, at 1C.
40. See GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 157; Julie Pitta, Electronic Democracy, FORBES, Oct.
1, 1990, at 132.
1996]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
information about state and city agency activities through the Internet.
These home pages have proliferated over the last year at the federal
level and have been a special project of both the White House and
House Speaker Gingrich.41
Of course, there are real dangers here. Hannah Arendt has written
that the rise of totalitarianism often is accompanied by the destruction
of mediating institutions, leaving citizens atomized to face the awesome
power of the state. 2 As William Kornhauser has said: "Mass society is
objectively the atomized society,"'4 available for manipulation by the
state. Thus far, however, the political fruits of technological change, be
it C-Span and Larry King, or the talk groups on the Internet, appear to
have promoted pluralism in the political system, even while bringing
citizens closer to the decision-making process.
C. Accountability Through Devolution
The principle of devolution, often called subsidiarity in the Euro-
pean Union context," is based on the notion that decisions made closest
to those affected are likely to be the best informed and certainly the
most democratically based. It suggests that actions to implement legiti-
mate government objectives should be taken at the lowest level of gov-
ernment capable of effectively addressing the problem.
This is not, of course, a new idea. The Anti-Federalists believed
that the effort to extend a single republic in the United States would
result in a loss of confidence in the legislature by the citizenry.'5 As
former Senator Malcolm Wallop noted in a recent law review article,
there is a direct connection between the centralization of power and
governmental accountability. 46 But with the advent of the New Deal
41. See Barbara J. Saffir, Exploring Federal Web Sites., WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1995, at
A21; Bob Minzesheimer, Congress Signs on to the "Information Revolution," USA TODAY, Jan.
6, 1995, at 8A.
42. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 460 (1966) (stating that to-
talitarian governments "destroy . . . all social, legal and political traditions of the country").
43. WILLIAM KORNHAUSER, THE POLITICS OF MASS SOCIETY 33 (1959).
44. George Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Commu-
nity and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 332 (1994).
45. See JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 129-30
(1974) (noting that this concern was a core principle of antifederalist thought); THE ANTFEDER-
ALIST No. 14, at 36-38 (George Clinton) (Morton Borden ed., 1965) (expressing the belief that a
republican system required a small territory, and that a centralized government was inadequate to
represent the interests of such a geographically diverse population).
46. Malcolm Wallop, The Centralization of Power and Governmental Unaccountability, 4
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487 (1995).
[Vol. 57:423
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
and the growth of the administrative state, the constitutional principles
of federalism, our American version of subsidiarity, seemed to have be-
come moribund. Nonetheless, there is significant evidence that the tide
has turned.47 Both the Republican Congress and Bill Clinton have spo-
ken about the need for federalist solutions such as block grants to the
states for programs like welfare and law enforcement.4 8 Furthermore,
the revival of Tenth Amendment scholarship and several recent Su-
preme Court cases bear witness to this trend.
For the first time in fifty years, the Court in the Lopez case struck
down a statute on Commerce Clause grounds. 49 In Gregory v. Ash-
croft,5 0 Justice O'Connor found in the Tenth Amendment a rule of
statutory interpretation requiring a heavy burden of showing that Con-
gress intended to overrule the states' "substantial sovereign power
under our constitutional scheme.' In New York v. United States,
Congress had passed legislation requiring the states to dispose of low-
level radioactive waste.5 2 The Court struck down the federal law, and,
in her majority opinion, O'Connor asserted that "[s]tate governments
are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal
Government. 53
It is more than simply pedantry to note that this focus on devolu-
tion is an expression not only of conservative Republican politics, but of
"New Left" ideology as well. As it began in the sixties, the New Left,
was committed to the "increase [of] democracy in the economic, politi-
cal, and cultural life of the nation. ' 54 Participatory democracy was an
"early emphasis" of the New Left, before the movement became a
more radical, revolution-oriented group.55 For example, in his book
47. Still, there is a view that state and local governments are not ready to handle newly
devolved responsibilities. See Rochelle L. Stanfield, Holding the Bag?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9, 1995,
at 2206 (arguing that these more accountable government units lack the experience and know-how
to run the programs currently being considered for transfer from the federal government).
48. See Cops and Commerce, US. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 11, 1995, at 26 (speculating
that Clinton and Congress will agree to block grants for police spending); Elizabeth Shogren,
Clinton, as Promised, Vetoes GOP Welfare Bill, PITT. POsT-GAzETTE, Jan. 10, 1996, at A7 (re-
porting that Clinton accepts the structure of the welfare reform proposal-block grants to the
states).
49. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
50. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
51. Id. at 461.
52. 505 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1992).
53. Id. at 188.
54. EDWARD J. BACClOCCO, JR., THE NEw LEFr IN AMERICA 109 (1974).
55. See JAMES L. WOOD, NEW LEFr IDEOLOGY: ITs DIMENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 6-7
(Sage Professional Papers in American Politics No. 04-022, 1975).
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Reveille for Radicals,56 Saul Alinsky sets forth the model "By-Laws of
the People's Organization. '57 This proposed institution devolves power
to the local level, guaranteeing representation for "any organization
representative of the people. . . in that area."58 "All power to the peo-
ple" may be New Left language, but it also reflects the views of the
new conservative populism. Both believe in devolution to the most im-
mediate governing authority, the reduction of bureaucracy, and in-
creased government accountability.
Recent years have shown innumerable examples of how devolution
to the states and privatization have created not only a more efficient
government but one far more accountable to the public .5  These exam-
ples of devolution include recent efforts to promote "block grants" to
the states to fulfill welfare responsibilities,"0 as well as efforts to shift
various environmental responsibilities to the states.6' Examples of
privatization of hitherto governmental functions include experiments
with school choice in Wisconsin62 and Pennsylvania,63 and privatization
of hospital systems in New York.
64
At the same time, we have seen a proliferation of neighborhood
associations such as residential community associations (130,000 of
which regulated the lives of over 30 million residents by the end of the
1980s),65 as well as an explosion of special taxing districts parallel to
56. SAUL ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS (1946).
57. Id. at 221-28.
58. Id. at 222.
59. See WILLIAM D. EGGERS & JOHN O'LEARY, REVOLUTION AT THE ROOTS: MAKING
OUR GOVERNMENT SMALLER, BETTER AND CLOSER TO HOME 64 (1995) (arguing that devolution
results in "decentralizing government" and "transferring responsibility from government to indi-
viduals, families and voluntary associations."). These are not just conservative or Republican
ideas. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992); JACOB B. UKELES, Do-
ING MORE WITH LESS (1982).
60. See H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Title I of this bill is entitled "Block Grants
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families."
61. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contempo-
rary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1995) (noting the recent shift toward increased state
responsibility and its potential impact on environmental policy).
62. EGGERS & O'LEARY, supra note 59, at 102-04.
63. Id. at 314-15; see also infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
64. Id. at 42.
65. Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375,
1375 n.1 (1994). This article sketches some of the legal issues inherent in residential community
associations. It focuses on the extent to which neighborhood associations can use "covenants" to
require uniformity in the lifestyle of members.
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local government, such as the 42nd Street Development Association,
through which business is better able to meet its specific needs.
66
The modern distrust of bureaucratic and managerial expertise (re-
flected, as Jerry Mashaw suggests, in the National Performance Re-
view's effort to slim down and "flatten" the federal government1
7 ) will
not stop with the "reinventing government" effort of Vice President
Gore. Instead of this Gore effort to make government more efficient,
the focus of Newt Gingrich and congressional Republicans has been to
review what activities are the appropriate functions of govern-
ment-federal and state. Thus, there will be a need to develop criteria
to look at various levels of federal, state, and city government and de-
termine what core functions are best suited to each. There will be a
need as well for criteria to determine when government is being inap-
propriately overextended. As Cleveland Mayor Michael White, a Dem-
ocrat, has noted:
The city of Cleveland operates a convention center, two golf courses, and a
host of other assets which would make a private-sector operator a profit-but we
operate them at a loss. We are probably the only operator of parking lots in our
area who doesn't know how to make a profit on parking. Is it the height of heresy
to suggest that companies who run convention centers, manage jails, and manage
parking lots can deliver our constituents a better service at a better price?6 8
It is the burden of my argument that technology will make devolu-
tion more likely in the twenty-first century. That is to say, the shift of
government responsibility to smaller government units can, and will,
work far more successfully due to technology. In part, technology fos-
ters decentralization because computer networks and videoconferencing
permit interactive dialogue between persons on the periphery, thus re-
ducing the necessity of control by the center. In part, the fact that
technology flattens middle management empowers line workers and al-
lows for a wide variety of choices within the administrative state. For
the educational system to work, you need not have every student in
every classroom in France following the exact same lesson plan each
and every day. The same should be true with regulatory activity in
these United States.
66. See, e.g., Susan McGinn, Business Zones, Amid Questions, Gain Popularity, N.Y.
TimEs, Sept. 11, 1994, Section 13LI, at 1.
67. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the
Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PrT. L. REV. 405 (1996).
68. EGGERS & O'LEARY, supra note 59, at 41.
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III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
A. The Standard Paradigm
The central theoretical issue for administrative law in the twenti-
eth century has been the drive to curtail agency discretion both through
formalized adjudication procedures and judicial review. This fear of
empowering bureaucrats with flexibility reflects a traditional concern
that the administrative state, if unchecked, would likely act arbitrarily
and capriciously.
Historically, administrative law's effort to check discretion by pro-
cedure has encrusted government with inbuilt inefficiencies.
Proceduralism leads to defensive government, in which the focus is on
ensuring that improprieties do not occur in public service. As Jerry
Mashaw has shown in his studies of the welfare state, proceduralism
puts a premium on fairness. 9 It also leads to centralized bureaucracy.
This, of course, is the purpose of much administrative procedure-to
ensure neutrality in the application of government power.
Let me give two brief examples. OSHA inspectors were histori-
cally understood to have no discretion in issuing citations when they
saw cause for complaint.7 0 Any decisions to reduce penalties or waive
prosecution had to be made by attorneys for OSHA (in the Solicitor's
office). This lack of discretionary authority probably reflected indus-
try's fears that OSHA inspectors possessed too much authority. The
result has been continual complaints about the regulatory nightmare of
OSHA. Under pressure from the Republican Congress, the Clinton ad-
ministration has found that the OSHA inspectors do have some discre-
tionary authority and have started to develop waiver programs for com-
panies in substantial compliance or who are in a cooperating mode.7 1
Similarly, much of the federal procurement process has been
designed to use procedural safeguards to protect against favoritism and
69. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 171-72 (1983); JERRY L. MASHAW,
DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158-60 (1985); Jerry L. Mashaw, "Rights" in the
Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1132 (1983).
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1988) (stating that the inspector, upon finding a violation,
"shall ... issue a citation to the employer") (emphasis added); BENJAMIN W. MiNTz, OSHA-
HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 358, 482 (1984). Mintz notes that OSHA is "based on the principle
that compliance inspections . . . are followed by inspections and penalties." Id. at 358. He notes
that OSHA has interpreted the "shall" language in the statute quoted as "mandatory, thus pre-
cluding on site, sanction-free consultation by OSHA representatives." Id. at 482 n.1.
71. See OSHA Policy on Written Program Violations Seeks "Consistent Enforcement" of
Standards, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 828 (Nov. 15, 1995).
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corruption. But as Steven Kelman, in the Administration of the Office
of Federal Procurement Policy, has pointed out:
We should deal with corruption directly by very strict criminal sanctions. We
should put corrupt people in jail for a long time. But you don't want to make the
system so inefficient on a daily basis that it make [sic] the lives of the 99.5
percent of honest people impossible. You don't fight corruption by creating an
awful procurement system. 2
New efforts at procurement reform are starting to take this point into
consideration. 73 Allowing federal agencies to buy "off the rack" and
simplifying how the government specifies the goods and services it
wants by streamlining the writing of procurement specifications not
only saves millions of dollars in employee time, but also empowers line
employees to use their flexibility in solving problems. However, while
these reforms will increase efficiency, they may well increase the possi-
bility of unfair results in specific instances.
Some of the tensions in empowering bureaucracy can be seen in
Philip Howard's recent best seller, The Death of Common Sense.74
Howard cites numerous examples of foolishness by government bureau-
crats. He points to the example of Mother Theresa, whose missionaries
of charity set aside $500,000 to renovate an abandoned building for the
homeless in the Bronx.7 5 The nuns did not believe that modern conve-
niences such as the dishwasher, washing machine, or elevator were nec-
essary.7 6 The project ran aground on the city's demand that they spend
$100,000 for an elevator which they would never use.77 After two years
Mother Theresa wrote the city that "[tihe Sisters felt they could use
the money much more fruitfully for soup and sandwiches," noting that
the episode "served to educate us about the law and its many
complexities."
7 8
While Howard's complaint could have been written by Newt
Gingrich, Howard offers a different solution. Although a severe critic
of the bureaucratic process, he does not propose fewer rules or no rules;
nor does he propose more detailed rules and more aggressive judicial
72. EGccRs & O'LEARY, suprc note 59, at 143.
73. See Kathleen Day, Streamlining Procurement Begins Phase 2, WASI. POST, Feb. 9,
1996, at A19.
74. PiLir K. HOWA.D, Thm DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994).
75. Id. at 3.
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review. Instead, his remedy would empower bureaucrats by giving them
more responsibility (or in administrative law terms more discretion) to
take matters into their own hands.7 9 He wants to give the bureaucrats
flexibility to waive rules or not to waive rules, to accept individuated
compliance solutions, and ignore the letter of the law to accomplish its
"spirit."80
Tracking Howard, the state of Florida has proposed a repeal of at
least half of Florida's 28,750 rules by the end of the 1996 legislative
session in favor of guidelines that will devolve greater discretion on
agency officials.8' These efforts, however, have achieved only limited
success, because the governor has vetoed a bill to reform the rule-mak-
ing process, while still searching for superfluous rules.8 2 The Canadian
Parliament has before it legislation that allows persons subject to regu-
lations to propose alternative compliance plans that still meet the "reg-
ulatory goals of the designated regulation." 83
In contrast, much of the regulatory reform effort by Republicans
over the last year has reflected a fear of empowering bureaucrats to do
just about anything without checking procedures. Thus, the regulatory
reform bill introduced by Senator Bob Dole looked to the judiciary to
provide accountability for bureaucratic decision making, a somewhat
unusual approach for avowed opponents of judicial activism. 4 The va-
rious iterations of this bill and its Contract with America analogues
offer extensive, some say innumerable, opportunities for judicial review
as a way of checking agency action. They provide review, for example,
of the substance as well as the form of agency cost/benefit analyses
and agency decisions to characterize rules as "major" or "minor."85
These legislative proposals also attain accountability by making
use of "sunset" provisions, in which a regulation loses force after a cer-
tain number of years and must be reauthorized, and "look-back" provi-
sions, by which a member of the regulated community can ask or re-
quire an agency to review the efficacy of a particular rule at any time,
79. Id. at 180.
80. Id.
81. William Booth. Florida Seeks End to Rule by the Book, WASH. I OST, Mar. 14, 1995,
at 1.
82. See Craig Quintana, Chiles Scuttles Regulatory-Reform Bill, OaLANDO SENTINEL,
July 13, 1995, at C1 (reporting the governor's claim thrt his agencies have identified nearly 3,400
rules for repeal, npd agencies controlled by the Florida Cabinet have id-ntified anothc~r 2,600).
83. House of Commons, Bill C-62, lt Sess., 35th Parliament (Ist reading Dec. 6, 1994).
84. S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
85. I.'. (proposing 5 U.S.C. §§ 622-625).
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perhaps even when the rule is about to be enforced on that party. 6
Further, the Dole bill not only allows for more extensive judicial review
of agency action, it would also require that proposed agency regulations
be brought back to Congress and "laid on the table,"87 where Congress
would have the opportunity to enact a "two-house" veto, clearly consti-
tutional even under Chadha.8 8 Indeed the regulatory reform enthusiasts
so distrust bureaucrats that they would codify executive branch review
(and control) of agency rulemaking that includes peer review by
outside scientists (including industry scientists) of the findings of
agency experts who conduct cost/benefit analysis. 89
In my view, technology will increase the opportunities for enlarged
yet "structured" discretion. It allows Congress to be clearer in its goals
and, in turn, to empower administrators with the flexibility needed to
achieve those goals. We must remember that administrative courts first
developed because of the need to make decisions heavily laden with
changing social science facts. We now have coherent ways to master
changing factual data. Thus, the opportunities for Congress to "double-
check" regulatory goals will make it easier to accept a broader range of
discretion by bureaucrats.
B. Emerging Issues in Administrative Law
If my views about technology and devolution are accurate, we are
likely to see a very different set of issues facing the regulatory process.
We will see, for example, a rebirth of interest in state and local admin-
istrative law, a subject shockingly ignored by most elite academics (the
exceptions, of course, being Arthur Bonfield,9" Harold Levinson,91 and
86. See S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1995) (which includes a "look-back" provi-
sion as part of the proposed Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act).
87. Id. (proposing 5 U.S.C. § 801).
88. INS v. Chadha, 454 U.S. 812 (1981).
89. S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1995) (proposing 5 U.S.C. § 640, which would
establish a program by w' ich agency experts and their findings would be reviewed by another
panel of scientists). A separate bill would codify traditional OMB review of proposed regulations.
See S. 291, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. § 403(b) (1995).
90. See, e.g., Arthu. E. Bnnfield, The Quest for an Ideal State Administrative Rulemaking
Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617 (1991); Arthur E. Bonfield, State Administrative Policy
Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. Rav. 121 (1990); Arthur
E. Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administra:ive Law, 72 VA. L. REv. 297 (1986); Arthur
E. 3onfield, Stat" Law in ihe Tearhing of Administrative La: A Critical Analysis of ihe Status




91. See, e.g., Harold Levinson, Moking Society's Legal System Accessible tb Society: The
Lawver's Role and Implications, 41 VAND. L. REV. 789 (1988); Harold Levinson. Legislative and
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Michael Asimow92). I say shocking because in the last twenty-five
years some of the most creative innovations in administrative law have
been at the state level. The systems to provide centralized review of
proposed state regulations in Arizona and California, which are, in
many respects, far more sophisticated than OMB's approach, are but
one example.93
It is hard for administrative lawyers to accept subsidiarity since, of
course, we are in the business of rationalizing, not eradicating, central-
ized power. Nonetheless, the fact is that the devolution of government
creates numerous issues of administrative law, particularly if one's goal
is devolution with accountability. Some of these issues are presented
below.
1. Issues of Preemption
In the past twenty years, the prevailing jurisprudential notion has
been that federal preemption is a doctrine that should be implemented
in an expansive spirit.9 " To do otherwise would be to condemn regu-
lated business to a skein of 50 different state rules. Further, lacking
any central control, there would be a "race to the bottom" in creating
and enforcing regulations. Rick Revesz has convincingly shown that
this is not true regarding state environmental regulation 5 and that
there is reason to believe this analysis would prove correct in other reg-
ulatory areas as well.9"
Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 79 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 43
(1992); Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication
Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1067 (1992).
93. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1051-41-1057 (Supp. 1995) (establishing a gover-
nor's regulatory review council); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11349-11349.6 (Deering Supp. 1996) (es-
tablishing a procedure for review of proposed regulations).
94. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1862 (1995) (advocating "partial
federal preemption of state law's allocation to management of agenda control ove, corporate char-
te- amendments"); William W. Buzzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination
Cleanup Approvals, Incentivev, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REv. 35,
t I 1 (1995) (noting that the "Frst wave" of scholarship favored federal preemption in the environ-
mental context).
95. See Rick Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition" Z2ethink!ng the "Lace to the
Bcttom" Ratiotale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992) (argu-
in. that ii.terstate comnetiti i may in facL benefit the cause of environ.aental regulation).
Q6. Id. a 125-54 (suggesting thai similar application of "race to the bottom" analysis is




As Daniel Boorstin has suggested, Americans are a nation of join-
ers.9 7 Alexis de Tocqueville points out that
Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to
build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the
antipodes; in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. . . .Wher-
ever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government in France, or
a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an
association."
More and more, government is devolving social welfare functions
from rigid state bureaucracies to charitable associations. These charita-
ble associations range from Catholic Charities and the Jewish Federa-
tion to neighborhood associations cleaning up and protecting their local
neighborhoods. Senator Daniel Coats has encouraged this approach by
proposing a tax credit of up to $500 ($1,000 for joint filers) to individu-
als donating both time and money to social service provider charities,
which undertake many of the welfare tasks hitherto pursued by the
government."9 At least one recent iteration of the Dole welfare bill
would allow religious institutions to receive federal monies for this
purpose.100
Developing rules for private involvement in previously public func-
tions will be a growth area for administrative law and a challenge for
government accountability. The growth of private sector entities which
fulfill public functions creates numerous issues for the traditional ad-
ministrative law paradigm. Public procurement rules could strangle pri-
vate sector procurement; yet issues of fairness and accountability can-
not be ignored.
3. The Administrative Procedure of Privatization
As the private sector begins to take over formerly governmental
functions, a large number of issues arise regarding whether these new
97. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMEMICANS: THE NATIONAL ExPERIENCE 49-50 (1967).
98. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106 (Phillips Bradley trans., Al
fred A. Knopf 1994) (1840).
99. See 141 CONG. REC S12906-07 (daily ed. Scpt. 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Coats)
(describing the Coats amendment and its tax credit). See generally Williamp J. Bennett & Dan
Coats, Movi'n Beyond Devolution, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at A14 (d.scussir.g the theory of
devolution to charitable instittticns dnd inaividuals, which is fn, theory behind the tax credit).
100. S. 1120, i0A.th Con.,;., Ist Sess. § 102(a) (1995) (allowing states to contract with reli-
gious olganizat:ons "to provide, ctrvices and administer programs").
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entities are to be run by private or public sector rules. 101 Issues of tort
liability, sovereign immunity, and procurement policy are affected by
the choice between public and private regimes.
A glimpse into the kinds of issues to be addressed can be seen in
an example close to Pittsburgh-the Wilkinsburg school privatization
experiment.'02 Two of the many issues related to that experiment are of
particular interest to administrative lawyers: the selection process for
contractors and the status of the "public" (or at least formerly public)
work staff.
In the Wilkinsburg case, the school board contracted out an entire
school's teaching function to a private company. 03 However one views
the result, the selection process was open and transparent, with the
school board sending out requests for proposals with no preconceived
private bidder in mind. 0 4 There was a level playing field. The school
board then hired an arm's-length consulting firm to review and grade
suitable bids. 0 5 As these kinds of privatizations expand, the "law" of
the selection process will become increasingly relevant.
As to jobs, some of the former "public" employees in Wilkinsburg
were laid off as the new "private" company brought on its own manag-
ers and line staff, 06 raising interesting questions about the nature of
public employment. The administrative law of privatization will have to
develop criteria for what responsibilities, if any, the formerly public
companies will have to the existing workforce.
The recent phenomenon of the mixed public/private corporation
provides still more confusion on the issue of what law to apply. 0 7 In
cases of federal government corporations and the Agency for Interna-
tional Development investment funds, there is no clear answer as to
101. Marianne Lavelle, Public Works Go Private, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at 1 (noting
that the privatization of public works raises the question of whether the entity is governed by
private or public law).
102. See Monica L. Haynes & Roger Stuart, All is Quiet During First Day of Classes at
Turner School, PTt. PosT-GAzarr, Sept. 6, 1995, at C1 (aescribing the circumstances of the
Wilkinsburg schoo, ooard's decision to privatize one of its elementary schools).
103. Monica L. Haynes & Matthew P. Smith, Company to Run School; Wilkinsburg
Board Approves Private Cont-act to Run Turner, PiTT. PosT-GAz'TTr, Mar. 22, 1995, at B1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Monica L. Haynes, Two Dozen Wilkinsbu.g Teacl zrs Furlougaed, h,'r. POST-
GAZETTE, July 26, 1995, at Al.
107. See Lavelle, supra note 101, at Al (discussing somL of the problems faced by pnv;.-
tiz-Jd ve.ntures, and the issue of what law to apply).
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whether the entity is public or private.10 8 This raises important ques-
tions of accountability because, when public money is involved, the pos-
sibility of potential taxpayer liability must be addressed. 09 This prob-
lem is not peculiar to the American system. Great Britain faces similar
questions of classification and accountability with what it terms
"quangos," which are semiautonomous business units fulfilling what
have historically been viewed as public purposes." 0
IV. CONCLUSION
The last hundred years of the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law celebrated in this centennial have been largely the century of the
administrative state. Many believe that the trajectory will continue in-
definitely. Such a path, however, can only lead to statism, which is in-
consistent, as Hayek has shown, with personal liberty."' As this article
suggests, the administrative state will face new challenges and take on
new forms in the twenty-first century. Advances in technology and the
increased devolution of governmental activity to cities, states, and the
private sector will increase government accountability while still em-
powering agency officials with the discretion they need to do their jobs
creatively and effectively. That is the structure of government account-
ability I believe our children will be talking about at the symposium for
the 200th anniversary of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
Certainly it is the structure of government accountability we should
strive for.
108. See A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L.
REv. 543, 605-14 (1995) (discussing issues of inconsistent treatment and accountability of federal
government corporations); David B. Ottaway, At U.S.-Sponsored Enterprise Funds, a Question of
Authority, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1996, at A19 (describing the issues raised when public funds are
involved in a nominally private operation).
109. See THOMAs H. STANTON, SAYING GOODBYE WHEN THE JOB IS DONE: THE COMING
PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 4-5 (1995) (arguing for complete
privatization because of potential taxpayer liability).
110. See CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 32-34
(1984).
111. See FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1941).
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